



## DXdao Gov. 2.0 Solution Requirements

### Problems

- DXD is not sustainably intertwined into DXdao long-term
- REP holders have no incentive for good governance

### General Goals

- Scalability (fractalization and cost)
- Decentralization

### Primitives

- REP is earned. Reputation is the on-chain representation of contributions to DXdao.
- DXD is the liquid financial value in DXdao
- Holding DXD does not necessitate governance participation
- Reputation should remain non-transferrable; a multiplier or constant may be applied for a new governance denominator, “voting power”
- DXD on-chain guarantee for DXdao financial claim

### Voting Power - What makes a governor

- Need both DXD and REP to have any voting power
- Limits on accumulating voting power in one address
- Voting power should decay over time

### Voting Mechanics

- Holographic consensus
- Flash loan resistance and protection against an economic attack
- Incentives for governors to participation