



# Fundamental Report

Prime Rating Report V2.1

**Protocol:** Dracula  
**Version:** V2.1  
**Date:** 24/02/2021  
**Previous Report:** —

**Author:** Degem2priceless  
**Reviewed by:** xm3van  
**Season/competition:** Season 2

## Scorecard

1. Value Proposition	Points
a) Novelty of the solution	2 / 15
b) Market fit/demand	2 / 15
c) Target Market Size	9 / 10
d) Competitiveness within market sector(s)	2 / 10
e) Integrations & Partnerships	0 / 15
<b>Total Points - Value Proposition</b>	<b>15 / 65</b>
2. Tokenomics	Points
a) Is the token sufficiently distributed?	10 / 15
b) What is the extent of the token's capabilities?	3 / 10
c) Is the issuance model able to improve the coordination of the protocol?	6 / 10
d) Is the value capture model able to accrue and distribute value?	7 / 10
e) Is the token sufficiently liquid to enable active use and trade?	0 / 5
f) Are there any extrinsic productivity use cases?	2 / 10
<b>Total Points - Tokenomics</b>	<b>28 / 60</b>
3. Team	Points
a) Is the team credible and public? (No, Partly, Yes & Anon , Yes & Public)	1 / 15
b) Does the team have relevant experience?	0 / 10
c) Does the team participate and help shape the public debate?	0 / 5



d) Is the team able to effectively attract and coordinate resources?	1 / 10
<b>Total Points - Team</b>	<b>2 / 40</b>
<b>4. Governance</b>	<b>Points</b>
a) Admin Keys	3 / 20
b) Extent of Governance capabilities	2 / 15
c) Active Governance contributors	2 / 5
d) Governance infrastructure	2 / 10
e) Robustness of Governance process	2 / 10
<b>Total Points - Governance</b>	<b>11 / 60</b>
<b>5. Regulatory</b>	<b>Points</b>
a) Does the protocol have any legal accountability?	N/A
b) What is the quality of the legal jurisdiction?	N/A
<b>Total Points - Regulatory</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>56 / 225</b>

## 1. Value Proposition

The Value Proposition section describes the value a protocol delivers to its users. Based on the proportion of the problem the protocol aims to solve and the potential of the protocol to effectively solve the problem - better than other industry solutions - a Value Proposition rating is created.

### a) Novelty of the solution (15 points)

This score evaluates the novelty (uniqueness) of the protocol. Has the protocol introduced any new innovations that help solve user's problems more efficiently? Is the project a fork? To what extent did they copy/fork the original?

**Answer:** [Dracula Protocol](#) is a decentralized finance (DeFi) tool and application that streamlines, aggregates & compounds yield across the leading farming platforms. The application is a one-stop-shop offering a wide spectrum of DeFi yield opportunities, where users save time & money, and maximize their yield farming returns. The protocol automatically collects farming rewards from underlying "victim adapter" platforms, sells those rewards for Ethereum (ETH), and invests the ETH in an interest-bearing compounding strategy. Upon withdrawing, users can choose to be paid in ETH or Dracula's native utility token (DRC).



One can tell that the Dracula protocol isn't unique in any way because a lot of DeFi yield platforms offer far superior innovations and have been around longer. Dracula (founded in October [2020](#)) is outdone by [better yield aggregating protocols](#) like [yearn.finance](#) (July 2020), [Pickle Finance](#) (September 2020) and [Harvest Finance](#) (Sept 2020).

Score:

2

## b) Market fit/demand (15 points)

This score evaluates the degree to which the protocol satisfies a strong market demand. The market fit evaluates if the protocol is able to satisfy the needs of a specific market (can also be measured by user adoption/ #of users). To what extent has the protocol proven to meet the demand of a specific market? Is the timing of the product right for the market? Is the protocol targeting the right market?

Answer: Even though the yield aggregating market is worth [billions](#), Dracula hasn't met the demands of the market. It has a mere [TVL](#) of \$3,937.66, 2446 [holders](#) and a [trading volume](#) less than \$10k at the time of writing, which is unimpressive for a yield farming platform. If we compare that to even a minor performing protocol like [Pickle Finance](#) with a TVL around \$42M, one can see that Dracula has performed awfully even though the product is right for the market.

The exact number of users couldn't be found but [Dune Analytics](#) does provide info on the [daily holders](#) as shown in the chart below. A chart for the daily trading volume is also added. Take note of the yellow arrow indicating current figures.

### 1. Daily holders



### 2. Trading volume



Score: 2

### c) Target market size? (10 points)

The target market size evaluates the current and future size of the problem the protocol is aiming to solve. The category of the Open Finance solution can be used as a reference to the target market (for example: Lending). Because Open Finance is by definition global, the global market for a specific problem equals the target market size.

**Answer:** The Defi [yield aggregating](https://www.coingecko.com/en/categories/yield-aggregator) market is a big one worth over \$2 billion as at the time of writing.

<https://www.coingecko.com/en/categories/yield-aggregator>

#### Top Yield Aggregator Coins by Market Capitalization Show Stats

The Yield Aggregator market cap today is \$2.49 Billion, a -5.5% change in the last 24 hours. [Read More about Yield Aggregator](#)

#	Coin	Price	1h	24h	7d	24h Volume
☆ 99	<b>Convex Finance</b> CVX	\$15.66	1.0%	-8.0%	-10.3%	\$20,685,197
☆ 111	<b>yearn.finance</b> YFI	\$18,419.07	1.1%	0.1%	-5.3%	\$281,457,263
☆ 287	<b>Rari Governance Token</b> RGT	\$14.66	0.8%	-4.6%	-12.9%	\$1,797,111
☆ 346	<b>Alpha Finance</b> ALPHA	\$0.278268	1.4%	-7.5%	-9.1%	\$4,580,826
☆ 349	<b>Beefy.Finance</b> BIFI	\$1,583.38	-0.6%	-2.8%	-27.4%	\$1,900,778
☆ 457	<b>Badger DAO</b> BADGER	\$7.39	2.8%	-2.6%	-6.7%	\$5,012,398
☆ 472	<b>DFI.money</b> YFII	\$1,780.99	2.3%	-1.1%	-6.1%	\$17,450,176
☆ 516	<b>Alpaca Finance</b> ALPACA	\$0.394538	-1.4%	4.6%	1.9%	\$9,176,822

Score: 9



## d) Competitiveness within market sector(s) (10 points)

This score evaluates the competitiveness of the protocol within the market sector(s) it operates in. This score offers a relative comparison of the protocol and other protocols operating in the same market sector(s). To evaluate this, metrics to directly compare with the competition can be used (e.g. TVL, trading volume, number of users).

**Answer:** Dracula hasn't shown any signs of competition at all. For the record, it can't even be found on [DeFi Pulse](#). It currently has a [TVL](#) of \$3,937, 2448 [holders](#) and a [trading volume](#) less than \$10k at the time of writing.

Compared to a yield aggregating protocol like [yearn.finance](#) with a [TVL](#) of almost \$3 billion, [daily trading](#) volume of \$282.3M and 46,766 [holders](#), we can see that it doesn't come any close. If this seems far-fetched, we can compare it to a lower TVL yield aggregating platform like Pickle Finance with a [TVL](#) of around \$44M, [daily trading](#) volume of over \$1M and 7,819 [holders](#), and still Dracula is nowhere near it.

**Score: 2**

## e) Integrations & Partnerships (15 points)

Due to crypto's open-source nature, the code of most protocols can easily be forked. This score represents a piece of "unforkable value". Some indicators to look at are the number of applications built on top of the protocol (vertical integration), other entities integrating the protocol's services (horizontal integration) or the number of relevant partnerships (be careful of logo collections/ partnerships without much purpose).

**Answer:**

Integrations

No applications have been built on top of the Dracula protocol and no other entities have integrated the protocol's services

Partnerships

No partnerships were found for the project.

**Score: 0**

## 2. Tokenomics

The Tokenomics section assesses the function of a protocol's token. This includes the token distribution, functionalities of the token, the ability of the token to incentivize positive behaviour in the protocol, and the ability of the token to capture a portion of the value created.

### a) Is the token sufficiently distributed? (15 points)

The token distribution can be an indicator of a healthy protocol. When the protocol tokens are widely distributed among different stakeholder groups and contributors, this genuinely improves the coordinating capability of the token and strengthens the resiliency of the protocol. Was the initial distribution balanced between relevant stakeholders? Are the tokens distributed over sufficient participants (10, 25, 100 largest addresses)?

**Answer:** DRC was [minted](#) at an inflationary rate until the circulating supply reached an [estimated 15M](#) DRC tokens.




## PrimeRating

Once that maximum supply was reached with the [deployment](#) of Dracula Protocol V2 [contracts](#), minting of DRC tokens was [permanently halted](#) as of April 30th, 2021.

Without a governance vote instructing the team to mint DRC tokens there is no tokenomic mechanism that allows the production of [additional DRC](#) tokens at this time.

According to their [tokenomics](#), 92% of the minted DRC go to “DRC to ETH” staking pools while 8% goes to the team and “DRC to DRC” staking pools in an equal share of 50% each.

The protocol has [2,317](#) holders and 89.2% of the tokens are held by the [top 100 holders](#),





Transfers **Holders** Info DEX Trades Contract Analytics Comments

Token Holders Chart

Top 1,000 holders (From a total of 2,441 holders) First <

Rank	Address	Quantity	Percentage	Value
1	<a href="#">0xcaabb5e44868f720924aa2c8c4809d4f236ed7ee</a>	1,628,560.593691737437322411	11.0392%	\$100,710.33
2	<a href="#">Uniswap V2: DRC 3</a>	1,284,291.236936695245419436	8.7056%	\$79,420.69
3	<a href="#">0xb221ef6e917c0a4ab5a105739b4906b18a762b67</a>	999,858.65085934272407643	6.7775%	\$61,831.35
4	<a href="#">0x4ca030ae9b2c92f44b3a28daddc2348d54382e59</a>	638,000	4.3247%	\$39,453.98
5	<a href="#">0xc8dfd57e82657f1e7edec5a9aa4906230c29a62a</a>	502,758.569735167378403283	3.4080%	\$31,090.64
6	<a href="#">0xa575d344050a12e6c1ccf5a5971342b67592c63c</a>	457,000	3.0978%	\$28,260.92
7	<a href="#">0xe8f0c91b2b704fab38ed337482d120ba826ad23</a>	340,495.017353034505260548	2.3080%	\$21,056.24
8	<a href="#">0xef9be1ace449eb63622b5c2bd4ee7af3b09dcc60</a>	301,570.326131463648168579	2.0442%	\$18,649.14
9	<a href="#">0x50e138a034672200e53e1231d5f74af3009d039f</a>	300,249	2.0352%	\$18,567.43
10	<a href="#">0xb6aa771c75c634b3e14b89284093ee93fa18c956</a>	290,978.379181132878079958	1.9724%	\$17,994.13

It can be seen from the images above that the exchange ([Uniswap](#)) accounts for about 8.7% of the tokens while the remaining 91.3% belong to ordinary addresses, an indicator that the tokens are distributed over sufficient participants.

Score: 10

## b) What is the extent of the token's capabilities? (10 points)

Is the token useful within the protocol? Does the token allow the holders to participate in governance or influence the protocol in any way? Does it serve any other purposes?

**Answer:** The token has limited uses. DRC tokens may be staked on the Dracula Protocol to earn a portion of 3.75% of all ETH distributed when a [drain](#) is initiated. A drain refers to the liquidation of rewards earned using the staked LP tokens from victim platforms and swapping the underlying platforms' reward tokens for ETH.

Also, holders of DRC may [vote on the proposals](#) to determine the future of the protocol through the governance system which assigns voting power to each DRC token holder proportionally based on the quantity of tokens held.

For other purposes, the team claims DRC can also be deposited on their [victim platforms](#) (Sushiswap, Dodo, etc.) as LP tokens to yield rewards in native victim platform tokens. However, other than [Sushiswap](#) and [Uniswap](#), search for a verification of this integration on Luaswap, Dodo, Alchemix and Mirror protocols cannot be found anywhere other than just being mentioned by the protocol.


Score: 3



### c) Is the issuance/distribution model able to improve the coordination of the protocol? (10 points)

To what extent does the issuance of the token support the advancement and function of the protocol? Are the tokens justifiably being issued? Does the issuance model incentivize the right behaviour? Are all relevant stakeholders benefiting from the issuance model?

**Answer:** The distribution model of the protocol can be seen in the image below:



92% of the minted DRC go to “DRC to ETH” staking pools while 8% goes to the team and “DRC to DRC” staking pools. “DRC to ETH” staking pool utilizes buyback mechanics. The [victim pools](#) earn tokens from their underlying protocols, such as UniSwap and SushiSwap. These yields are gathered through [draining](#), where the underlying tokens earned (UNI, SUSHI, PICKLE) are sold for WETH. 50% of the WETH goes to buying and burning DRC. 45% of the WETH goes to provide liquidity for the DRC-ETH, which is locked permanently. The remaining 5% goes to fund the pool, which is how DRC stakers in this pool earn yields in ETH.

“DRC to DRC” staking pool utilizes mint and rewards distribution. Stakers of this pool earn 4% of the total DRC mint. The remaining 4% of minted DRC goes to the team. With the team getting only 4%, as much as 96% of the tokens are directed at running the protocol. This distribution is quite fair and everybody benefits.


Score: 6



## d) Is the value capture model able to accrue and distribute value? (10 points)

A value accrual and distribution mechanism can help improve the utility of a token and its ability to be used as an effective coordination mechanism. Does the protocol have mechanisms to distribute some of the value created to the token holders?

**Answer:** This is best demonstrated with an image from their [medium](#).



From the image

- DRC tokens may be staked on the Dracula Protocol to earn a portion of 3.75% of all ETH distributed when a [drain](#) is initiated.
- 85% of rewards get deposited into a single ETH yield earning strategy where users can withdraw in ETH or DRC, or deposit into a LINK-ETH pool.
- 3.75% or rewards also go to a developer fund.

Clearly there are mechanisms to distribute value created to users.

**Score: 7**

## e) Is the token sufficiently liquid to enable active use and trade? (5 points)

Is the token widely available and is there sufficient liquidity available to facilitate all protocol functionalities?

**Answer:** No it isn't sufficiently liquid. With a [trading volume](#) less than \$30k and a [market cap](#) less than \$1M at the time of writing, it can only be found on a few markets as shown by [Coingecko](#) (Uniswap, Sushiswap and Bilaxy).



## Dracula Token Markets

Affiliate disclosures

#	Exchange	Pair	Price	Spread	+2% Depth	-2% Depth	24h Volume	Volume %
1	Uniswap (v2)	DRC/WETH <a href="#">Live Chart</a>	\$0.061563	0.61%	\$3,178	\$3,169	\$8,665	46.19%
2	Sushiswap	DRC/WETH <a href="#">Live Chart</a>	\$0.061848	0.62%	\$557	\$555	\$6,022	32.11%
3	Bilaxy	DRC/ETH	\$0.057437	16.42%	\$0	\$0	\$4,073	21.72%

Score: 0

## f) Are there any extrinsic productivity use cases for the token? (10 points)

Besides the protocol's value distribution model as described in 2. d), can the token be used productively on other protocols (e.g. as collateral, for lending, LPing, yield farming, etc.)?

**Answer:** They do state [here](#) that the token can be used to provide liquidity on [other yield farming protocols](#) ("victims") like Sushiswap, Luaswap, Pickle and Dodo to earn rewards in the native tokens of these platforms. However, market information for transactions on all these protocols mentioned cannot be found. With market info on only [Uniswap](#) and [Sushiswap](#), the token can only be used on a couple of protocols with limited productivity.

Score: 2

## 3. Team

The Team section describes the quality of the team behind the protocol. The current version of Prime Rating favours teams that are publicly identifiable. In the case of an anon team, the track record of the specific anons involved can be taken into account

### a) Is the team credible and public? (15 points)

Are the identities of the core contributors and team publicly identified? In the case of anon team members, is there any way to track their background/record?

**Answer:** The only information found on the team is from this [medium article](#). The team members can be seen below.



We currently have 4 different team members that control the multisig wallet:

**Aaron0v** (Core Developer) —  
0xbDad9D5361dEfc9a806D348c02034224C56747Fa

**Mzdor** (Core Developer) —  
0x930a152Dcc9a1855c846ebd2960EE4f525695e64

**Farmer Brown** (Business Development) —  
0xFBD9123f3CA030632C5fC5948dfebb38B0b115f2

**Dio** (Founder) — 0xE991057660d01d6701E74590719A193727945D91

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Several searches revealed no public identities of the team so it's fair to say the team is anonymous. There isn't any way to also track the backgrounds of the team members. The [LinkedIn page](#) of the protocol doesn't exist. With the abysmal performance in terms of [trading volume](#), [TVL](#), etc. as mentioned earlier, one can say the team isn't credible.

Score: 1

## b) Does the team have relevant experience? (10 points)

Are there any documents or trails available to showcase the track record of the team? Do the team members have relevant backgrounds and skill sets?

**Answer:** Information on the team members couldn't be found as they remain anonymous. The [twitter account](#) of the protocol doesn't reveal much about the team other than announcements and some giveaways. The [discord](#) isn't so active as well. Only the [telegram channel](#) seems active a little but it also doesn't give much indication of relevant experience

Score: 0

## c) Does the team participate and help shape the public debate? (5 points)

To what extent do the protocol contributors participate in the public debate around open finance? Are the team members giving presentations, sharing their thoughts and opinions, and do they help raise the collective intelligence of the industry?

**Answer:** With no information found on the team members and records of no contribution to the public debate, it's safe to say the team members don't shape the public debate in any way.

Score: 0



## d) Is the team able to effectively attract and coordinate resources? (10 points)

How effective is the team at attracting and coordinating resources for the benefit of the protocol? Has the team raised sufficient funding or are there mechanisms in place to attract resources when needed?

**Answer:** The team hasn't been able to effectively attract and coordinate resources. Not much is mentioned in terms of attracting resources. Even though advertising can attract resources, the team states [here](#) categorically that it is against it. With regards to funding, no one knows how sales of the token were carried out as there isn't any information on an ICO or IDO. The only source of funding mentioned is through [draining](#) (I've already explained this). Each drain is funded by a portion of the underlying reward yields harvested from the victim pools and the [team](#) is in charge of performing the drain daily. Of the rewards earned, only 3.75% goes to a developer fund and 1.5% to a gas fund. The rest go to liquidity providers.

**Score: 1**

## 4. Governance

The Governance section evaluates how the protocol is governed and who the governors are. The different governance functionalities and processes are evaluated to determine to what extent the Protocol will be able to self-govern in a way that ensures the development of the protocols while respecting the needs of all current and future stakeholders.

### a) Admin Keys (20 points)

Admin Keys allow some critical functionalities of a protocol to be controlled by an admin. This allows the developers to react to potential bugs, but also creates a risk as the developers could potentially misuse the admin keys to exploit the protocol. Does the protocol have admin keys and how are they managed?

**Answer:** Dracula relied on a core team entirely since its inception according to this [medium article](#). This had several limitations including centralisation, where the developer funds were under the control of the founders. In order to facilitate a more democratic system, Dracula Protocol has now transitioned into a [Decentralised Autonomous Organization](#) (DAO).

Dracula Protocol is now governed by its members (even though there isn't much reliable proof of that), where any movement of funds from the DAO will have to be approved by stakeholders and submitted by 2 of the 4 multisig holders. The Dracula Protocol multisig wallet can be found [here](#).

The four team members that control the multi-sig wallet are shown below.



We currently have 4 different team members that control the multisig wallet:

**Aaron0v** (Core Developer) —

0xbDad9D5361dEfc9a806D348c02034224C56747Fa

**Mzdor** (Core Developer) —

0x930a152Dcc9a1855c846ebd2960EE4f525695e64

**Farmer Brown** (Business Development) —

0xFBD9123f3CA030632C5fC5948dfebb38B0b115f2

**Dio** (Founder) — 0xE991057660d01d6701E74590719A193727945D91

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Note: The exact identities of these developers isn't known.

Members of the DAO, which are DRC token holders, can propose new members to the multisig wallet, or vote to remove members. DRC token holders will also be responsible for the direction of Dracula Protocol.

However, with no information of public identities found on the team members, records of no contribution to the public debate and no indication of relevant experience, there's a high risk as the developers could potentially misuse the admin keys to exploit the protocol.

**Score: 3**

## **b) Extent of Governance capabilities (15 points)**

Distributed governance allows the token holders to participate in the governance of open finance protocols. How much influence does the governance mechanism have? Are the votes affecting on-chain changes or do they function solely as signals to the team?

**Answer:** There isn't much info on distributed governance other than the protocol just mentioning it in their [article](#). Even though the protocol [states](#) that members of the DAO, which are DRC token holders, can propose new members to the multisig wallet, or vote to remove members and also be responsible for the direction of Dracula Protocol, the only proof of any change are these off-chain [Snapshot votes](#). Basic checks show that these votes function as signals to the team. Check the image below.





**Dracula Protocol**  
12 members

Join

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Proposals  
New proposal  
About

Proposals

All ▾

Dracula Protocol by 0xC87c...8e95 Core Closed

**Q4- ETH Victims or Cross-chain?**

The purpose of this proposal is to understand what the community rather have the development team focus on this quarter: Adding new ETH bas...

✓ Focus on Cross-chain - 583K DRC

Dracula Protocol by 0x9462...9873 Closed

**DIP-03: Migrate from Uniswap to Sushi**

Abstract: Sushi has recently announced that the DRC / ETH pool (<https://app.sushi.com/add/0xb78b3320493a4efaa1028130c5ba26f0b6085ef8/ETH>) w...

✓ Yes - 1.2M DRC

Dracula Protocol by 0x9462...9873 Closed

Score: 2

**c) Active Governance contributors (5 points)**

Governance is a process that can be rather resource-intensive if executed well. To ensure good governance is practiced by the protocol, it's important to have a sufficient number of governors allocate resources to the governance process of the protocol. How many individuals participate in the debate around the protocol? How active are voters?

**Answer:** Voters are fairly active on the dracula [voting site](#). Below are the last four votes from the site with the number of participants.

1. 34 votes



← Back

### Q4- ETH Victims or Cross-chain?

Closed Dracula Protocol by 0xC87c...8e95 Core Share ...

The purpose of this proposal is to understand what the community rather have the development team focus on this quarter:

Adding new ETH based victim adapters  
-or-  
Focus on cross-chain implementations

Per our post-launch update on Monday 11/8, the team is actively pursuing meetings with several TradeFi funds regarding potential partnership opportunities. The results of this proposal will be a helpful input for our upcoming TradeFi meetings as we discuss technical options, strategy, and prioritization.

[Show more](#)

**Votes** 34

Ox49F3...eeC6	Focus on Cross-chain	269K DRC
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\*Untitled - Notepad

**Information**

Strategie(s)

IPFS #QmRWWVje

Voting system Single choice voting

Start date Nov 15, 2021, 7:30 PM

End date Nov 19, 2021, 7:30 PM

Snapshot 13,622,159

**Results**

Focus on Cross-c...	583K DRC	62.48%
Focus on ETH Vic...	350K DRC	37.52%

2. 38 votes

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### DIP-03: Migrate from Uniswap to Sushi

Closed Dracula Protocol by 0x9462...9873 Share ...

#### Abstract:

Sushi has recently announced that the DRC / ETH pool (<https://app.sushi.com/add/0xb78b3320493a4efaa1028130c5ba26f0b6085ef8/ETH>) will be incentivized with their native token SUSHI through their Onsen program. In order to maintain these rewards, the DRC Onsen pool must continually receive votes from oSUSHI holders.

Through our earlier partnership with SUSHI, the Dracula DAO will receive 2% of all SUSHI earned through Dracula Protocol stakers. This xSUSHI can be staked for oSUSHI which will be used to vote for continuing rewards on the F

[Show more](#)

**Votes** 38

**Information**

Strategie(s)

IPFS #QmRVKSF

Voting system Single choice voting

Start date May 20, 2021, 7:00 PM

End date May 22, 2021, 7:00 PM

Snapshot 12,468,540

**Results**

Yes 1.2M DRC	99.84%
No 1.9K DRC	0.16%

3. 63 votes



← Back

## DIP-02: Introduce xDRC

Closed Dracula Protocol by 0x9462...9873

↑ Share ...

### Abstract

Staking DRC in Dracula Protocol currently will earn users a portion of each drain, which is paid in ETH. This staking does not give a receipt token, such as the BLOOD token we had in V1, due to ETH being the reward token. As we wait to redeploy V2.1, the Dracula team has decided to take this time to work towards a potential improvement of DRC staking.

### Proposal

Show more

Votes 63

#### Information

Strategie(s)

IPFS #QmRvMuZ

Voting system Single choice voting

Start date May 15, 2021, 10:00 AM

End date May 19, 2021, 7:00 PM

Snapshot 12,441,216

#### Results

Yes 1M DRC 98.47%

No 16K DRC 1.53%

4. 136 votes

← Back

## DIP-01: Liquidity Provider Incentives

Closed Dracula Protocol by 0x9462...9873

↑ Share ...

### Abstract

As we get closer to our V2 launch, the Dracula team has decided to leave a core decision up to the community regarding liquidity provider incentives. This vote will last 48 hours, and although the decision can be changed once decided, we hope to make the result of this decision final.

### Proposal

Provide incentives to two different pools for liquidity providers, one being the DRC / ETH pool on and the other being the DRC /

Show more

Votes 136

#### Information

Strategie(s)

IPFS #QmNz3r3

Voting system Single choice voting

Start date Apr 22, 2021, 7:00 PM

End date Apr 24, 2021, 7:00 PM

Snapshot 12,291,199

#### Results

No 1.2M DRC 84.11%

Yes 232K DRC 15.89%

Much of the protocol's debate goes on in [telegram](#) with participants similar to the number of voters posted above. . The [discord](#) channel isn't so active.

Score: 2



## d) Governance technology/infrastructure (10 points)

The Governance infrastructure relates to the technology, software, and models used by the protocol's governance. Does the protocol have a reliable and usable voting mechanism? Are there channels for governance debate? Is there sufficient documentation available?

**Answer:** There are channels for the protocol's governance debates. These are [discord](#) and [telegram](#). Of the two, the telegram group is the fairly active one. As mentioned before, the protocol has a reliable [voting site](#).

I still think the governance structure is limited, because the discord is almost lifeless with any debate hardly going on over there while the voting mechanism isn't usable because the team still takes major decisions on behalf of the protocol.

**Score: 2**

## e) Robustness of Governance process (10 points)

This score requires documentation specifically on the governance process that sets the basic framework in terms of agreements, norms, and language for governing the protocol and to create social consensus. Does the protocol have a formal governance process? How robust is the governance process and does it promote good governance?

**Answer:** The protocol's governance process is clearly laid out in their [documents here](#), but it is not robust in my discretion. In summary, anyone can start a proposal, but if your proposal gains enough momentum, only then will the Dracula Team raise it to an official [Dracula Improvement Proposal](#) which will then be passed on to the community for voting. To me, this means no matter how much of a very important proposal a user raises, its acceptance depends on momentum. This isn't desirable because at the end, the team still takes major decisions on behalf of the protocol.

**Score: 2**

# 5. Regulatory

The Regulatory section describes the extent and quality of the regulatory environment that affects the Protocol. To be able to guarantee functionality, security, and legality the protocol should comply with regulatory requirements, or limit itself to facilitating services to users who are willing to operate outside of the traditional regulatory environment.

## a) Does the protocol have any legal accountability? (15 points)

Does the protocol have any form of legal accountability? Can users and partners hold the protocol accountable in case of a breach of the agreement?

**Answer:** Search for the exact location of the protocol has proved futile with nothing found.

**Score: N/A**



## b) What is the quality of the legal jurisdiction? (10 points)

If the protocol has a legal entity, what is the quality of the jurisdiction the entity is established in? Will the jurisdiction be able to facilitate the legal framework for the protocol to expand while remaining accountable.

**Answer:** No one can tell as the protocol has no legal entity.

**Score:** N/A

**About the Author:** [Degem2priceless](#). I am a crypto and web 3 researcher and enthusiast looking forward to gaining experience as a rater with DAOs and making a full time living off cryptocurrencies.